Shielding Ohio\u27s Newborns: Defending a Broad Interpretation of Child within the Meaning of O.R.C. Sec. 3113.31 by Hofstetter, John
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2010
Shielding Ohio's Newborns: Defending a Broad
Interpretation of Child within the Meaning of
O.R.C. Sec. 3113.31
John Hofstetter
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Family Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Shielding Ohio's Newborns: Defending a Broad Interpretation of Child within the Meaning of O.R.C. Sec. 3113.31 , 58 Clev. St.
L. Rev. 717 (2010)
  
 
719 
SHIELDING OHIO’S NEWBORNS: DEFENDING A 
BROAD INTERPRETATION OF “CHILD” WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF O.R.C. § 3113.31 
JOHN HOFSTETTER∗ 
  
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 720 
 II. AN OVERVIEW OF OHIO CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS .......... 722 
A. The History and Function of CPOs in the  
Context of Domestic Violence...................................... 722 
B.  The Text of O.R.C. § 3113.31 ........................................ 725 
 III. AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS,  
CASE-LAW, SCHOLARLY RESEARCH, AND OHIO STATUTES 
SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS OF VIABLE FETUSES .................... 726 
A. The Prevalence of Domestic Violence Among  
Pregnant Women ......................................................... 726 
B. Roe v. Wade ................................................................ 727 
C. In re Ruiz ..................................................................... 728 
D. In re Baby Boy Blackshear .......................................... 729 
E. Werling v. Sandy ......................................................... 731 
F. In re Gloria C. .............................................................. 732 
G. In re Dittrick Infant...................................................... 733 
H. In re Melissa Woodin .................................................. 734 
I. Scholarly Support ........................................................ 735 
J. Statutory Support......................................................... 736 
 IV. HOW THE ISSUES OF MATERNAL MORBIDITY AND CHILD 
ABDUCTION ILLUSTRATE THE SAFETY CONCERNS CREATED BY 
A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF O.R.C. § 3113.31 ............. 738 
A. An Overview of the Issue of Maternal Morbidity ........ 738 
B. An Overview of the Issue of Parental Kidnapping ...... 739 
C. How These Factors Combine to Allow Abusive  
Fathers to Exploit the Narrow Interpretation of O.R.C. § 
3113.31 ........................................................................ 741 
 V. HOW A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF O.R.C. § 3113.31  
FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR CHILD SAFETY CONCERNS OCCURRING 
WHEN A MOTHER IS COERCED INTO RETURNING TO HER 
ABUSER ............................................................................... 742 
                                                          
∗
 J.D. expected, May 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A. The Ohio State University.  The 
author would like to thank Professor Kevin F. O'Neill, Professor Lorie L. McCaughan, Daniel M. Fennick, and Lorraine Doucette 
for their invaluable input and guidance; and William and Deborah Hofstetter for their love, patience, and encouragement. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
720 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:719 
 
 VI. CONCERNS REGARDING WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 744 
 VII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 747 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gabrielle Smith was the victim of domestic violence perpetrated by her live-in 
boyfriend, Kevin Martin.1  On June 8, 2008, Martin forced Smith to go for a ride in 
his car, and then proceeded to beat her savagely.2  During this journey of terror, 
Martin struck Smith with a pistol, threatened to stab her in the neck with a 
screwdriver, and repeatedly smashed her head into the steering wheel.3  Sadly, this 
tragic episode was not the first time that Martin had attacked Smith; he had battered 
and threatened his girlfriend on numerous previous occasions.4  
Criminal charges stemming from this incident were filed against Kevin Martin, 
yet Gabrielle Smith still feared what he would do to her once he was eventually 
released from police custody.5  In order to shield herself from further attacks, Smith 
filed for a civil protection order (CPO) against her boyfriend.6  Like thousands of 
other CPOs issued annually across the state of Ohio,7 the particular court order that 
Smith desired would restrict her abuser’s ability to approach her and continue a cycle 
of violence.8  It would also impose harsh criminal penalties upon Martin if he failed 
to abide by its terms.9  On July 16, 2008, the Domestic Division of the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas granted Smith the injunctive relief that she sought.10  
Very soon thereafter, however, it became apparent that the CPO she had just 
obtained was deficient in one very important respect: it did not designate her viable, 
unborn daughter as a protected party.11  Martin was the father of this developing 
fetus and had previously threatened to shoot it while pressing the barrel of a gun to 
Smith’s stomach.12  Ohio Revised Code section 3113.31 (“O.R.C. § 3113.31”), the 
Ohio statute governing domestic violence, permitted Smith to petition the court to 
add to the CPO any “child” previously threatened by a family member’s abusive 
                                                          
 
1
 Smith v. Martin, No. 08AP-692, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2955 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 
2009). 
 
2
 Modified Order of Protection Smith v. Martin, No. 08AP-692, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2955 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 2009). 
 
3
 Id.   
 
4
 Id.  
 
5
 Id.   
 
6
 Smith, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2955, at *1. 
 
7
 THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, 2007 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 108 (2007).   
 
8
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 
9
 Id. § 3113.31(L)(1). 
 
10
 Smith, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2955, at *1. 
 
11
 Id.  
 
12
 Modified Order of Protection, supra note 2. 
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acts.13  Yet, when Smith attempted to modify her CPO to extend protection to her 
developing fetus, her request was summarily denied by the domestic court judge.14  
Thus, when Smith’s child would be born only a few weeks later, the newborn would 
not enjoy the legal aegis of a protective order against her father.15  
The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court.16  
In Smith v. Martin, the appellate court refused Smith’s request to interpret O.R.C. § 
3113.31 in a way that would recognize her viable fetus as a “child” entitled to a 
CPO.17  The court held that “[t]he trial court . . . effectively addressed the problem 
by ordering the boyfriend to stay away from Smith and to avoid contact. . . . The 
boyfriend obviously could not harm the child without having contact with the mother 
as long as the child was in utero.”18  
Over the last couple of decades, Ohio courts have begun to recognize the legal 
interests of viable fetuses.19  Despite this trend, the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
still refused to interpret O.R.C. § 3113.31 broadly.20  The appellate court even noted 
the potential that its interpretation might create situations in which “it would be a 
hardship for the mother to return to court to obtain a civil protection order for the 
child immediately after giving birth.”21  Smith herself experienced such hardship.  
After she gave birth to her daughter, three long months would go by before she was 
finally able to modify her CPO properly.22  During this period, Kevin Martin 
unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap Smith’s newborn baby.23 
Smith’s case exemplifies why the prevailing judicial interpretation of O.R.C § 
3113.31 is erroneous.  In ruling that a viable, unborn fetus is not a “child” under 
O.R.C. § 3113.31, courts essentially force newborns to undergo some period of time 
without adequate legal protection from domestic violence.  Such a lapse in coverage 
can create opportunities for abusers to carry out acts of aggression or violence 
against unprotected children.  
                                                          
 
13
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(C). 
 
14
 Smith, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2955, at *1.  
 
15
 Modified Order of Protection, supra note 2.  
 
16
 Smith, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2955, at *6.  
 
17
 Id.  
 
18
 Id. at *1-2 (emphasis added).  
 
19
 See In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a mother 
may be civilly liable to her newborn child predicated solely on the prenatal conduct of the 
mother); Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985) (holding that a wrongful death 
action may lie on behalf of unborn child); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 
334 (Ohio 1949) (holding that tort actions may lie for unborn children); In re Ruiz, 500 
N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986) (holding that mothers may be punished for abusing fetuses).  
 
20
 Smith, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2955, at *6-7. 
 
21
 Id. at *6. 
 
22
 Modified Order of Protection, supra note 2.  
 
23
 See Docket Search, FRANKLIN CNTY. CLERK OF COURTS, http://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin. 
oh.us/CaseInformationOnline/ (accept “conditions of use and privacy policy”; then search 
“Last Name” for “Martin,” “First Name” for “Kevin,” “Middle Init” for “K”; follow “Case” 
for “08 CR 006650” and “08 CR 007122” hyperlinks). 
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This note will argue that viable fetuses should be viewed as “children” within the 
meaning of O.R.C. § 3113.31, therefore qualifying them for the protections afforded 
by CPOs.  It will focus on the urgent need for such an interpretation based on child 
safety concerns arising primarily after the birth of the child, rather than those 
existing while the child is still in utero.  Part II of this note will provide an overview 
of civil protection orders within the state of Ohio.  Part III will analyze domestic 
violence statistics, case-law, scholarly research, and existing Ohio statutes in order to 
demonstrate why unborn, viable fetuses should be interpreted as “children” under 
O.R.C. § 3113.31.  Part IV will show how the issue of maternal morbidity illustrates 
the child safety concerns created by a narrow interpretation of O.R.C. § 3113.31.  It 
will also explain how the problem of parental kidnapping accentuates these 
concerns.  Part V will explain how a narrow interpretation of O.R.C. § 3113.31 also 
fails to account for child safety concerns occurring when a mother has been coerced 
into returning to her abuser.  Part VI will assuage any concerns among feminist 
advocates by demonstrating that the proposed broad interpretation of the word 
“child” will not impinge upon female reproductive rights.  This note will conclude 
by calling upon Ohio courts to interpret O.R.C. § 3113.31 broadly to include viable 
unborn fetuses, thereby ensuring safety from domestic violence for all of Ohio’s 
children.    
II. AN OVERVIEW OF OHIO CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS 
A.  The History and Function of CPOs in the Context of Domestic Violence 
Section 3113.31 of the Ohio Revised Code was enacted in 197824 in the wake of 
a national movement directed towards addressing domestic violence as a public 
health problem.25  Domestic violence, sometimes also referred to as “family 
violence” or “intimate partner violence,” can come in many forms.26  In the broadest 
sense, domestic violence “is the physical, emotional, or psychological abuse or threat 
                                                          
 
24
 Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ohio 1997). 
 
25
 Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the 
Reality of Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 35, 37 (2008).  Baker does an excellent job 
outlining the long and tragic history of domestic violence: 
Domestic abuse, under other guises such as “wife beating” or “chastisement,” is an 
ancient phenomenon, and laws have addressed it for ages.  The Romans limited such 
practices, and the English common-law gave rise to the famous “Rule of Thumb.”  
American law condoned or ignored family violence through the mid-1800s, when a 
few jurisdictions began to eliminate virtual immunity for wife beaters and generated 
some punishments for abusers.  Even so, until the 1960s, courts and legislatures still 
were reluctant to interfere in “family matters,” leaving violence behind closed doors 
as a purely private province and denying useful legal remedies to victims.  
Id. at 36-37. 
 
26
 See FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION CTR. OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, WHAT YOU 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT FAMILY VIOLENCE 1 (2009) [hereinafter FAMILY VIOLENCE]; CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FACT 
SHEET (2009) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].  
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of abuse of a family or household member.”27  The United States Centers for Disease 
Control has stated:  
Intimate partner violence (IPV) occurs between two people in a close 
relationship.  The term “intimate partner” includes current and former 
spouses and dating partners.  IPV exists along a continuum from a single 
episode of violence to ongoing battering.  IPV includes four types of 
behavior: Physical violence is when a person hurts or tries to hurt a 
partner by hitting, kicking, or other type of physical force.  Sexual 
violence is forcing a partner to take part in a sex act when the partner does 
not consent.  Threats of physical or sexual violence include the use of 
words, gestures, weapons, or other means to communicate the intent to 
cause harm.  Emotional abuse is threatening a partner or his or her 
possessions or loved ones, or harming a partner’s sense of self-worth.  
Examples are stalking, name-calling, intimidation, or not letting a partner 
see friends and family.28 
In 2006 alone, Ohio law enforcement agencies collectively registered almost 
72,000 domestic violence disputes.29  Across the United States, it is estimated that 
almost 5.3 million intimate partner victimizations occur annually.30  It is further 
estimated that the overall cost of domestic violence within the United States exceeds 
5.8 billion dollars a year.31  
 The logic behind the creation of O.R.C. § 3113.31 was stated succinctly by the 
Ohio Supreme Court in Felton v. Felton.32  There, the court stated that “[t]he [Ohio] 
                                                          
 
27
 FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 26, at 1. 
 
28
 FACT SHEET, supra note 26, at 1.  The CDC’s fact sheet outlines the manifold reasons 
why domestic violence is truly a public health problem:  
  IPV can affect health in many ways.  The longer the violence goes on, the more 
serious the effects.   
  Many victims suffer physical injuries.  Some are minor like cuts, scratches, bruises, 
and welts.  Others are more serious and can cause lasting disabilities.  These include 
broken bones, internal bleeding, and head trauma.   
  Not all injuries are physical.  IPV can also cause emotional harm.  Victims often 
have low self esteem.  They may have a hard time trusting others and being in 
relationships.  The anger and stress that victims feel may lead to eating disorders and 
depression.  Some victims even think about or commit suicide.   
  IPV is linked to harmful health behaviors as well.  Victims are more likely to 
smoke, abuse alcohol, use drugs, and engage in risky sexual activity.  
Id. 
 
29
 FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 26, at 1.  
 
30
 Id.  
 
31
 Id.  
 
32
 Felton, 679 N.E.2d at 674.  The Felton case involved the sufficiency of evidence 
necessary for a formerly abused wife to go forward with her CPO case.  Id.  The Ohio 
Supreme Court ruled that all that was necessary for the plaintiff to carry her burden of 
production was a preponderance of the evidence demonstrating that domestic violence had 
occurred.  Id. at 678.  
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General Assembly enacted the domestic violence statute specifically to criminalize 
those activities commonly known as domestic violence and to authorize a court to 
issue protection orders designed to ensure the safety and protection of a complainant 
in a domestic violence case.”33  As defined in the statute, domestic violence occurs 
when an individual attempts to cause bodily injury to a family member.34  Imminent 
threats of physical harm, sex offenses, and stalking perpetrated against a family 
member are also defined within the statute as forms of domestic violence.35  
When such domestic violence occurs, victims may seek a CPO on behalf of 
themselves and any other “family or household members” threatened by the 
violence.36  Once properly obtained after a court hearing, a CPO serves as a powerful 
bulwark against future acts of domestic violence.37  CPOs impose strict “stay away” 
proscriptions upon abusive parties, restraining them from coming within a specified 
proximity to their victims.38  In the words of the Felton court, “[i]n Ohio, the 
domestic violence statutes grant police and courts great authority to enforce 
protection orders, and violations of those protection orders incur harsh [criminal] 
penalties. . . .  Therefore, protection orders issued pursuant to O.R.C. § 3113.31 are 
the . . . appropriate and efficacious method to prevent future domestic 
violence . . . .”39  Empirical studies show that CPOs are highly effective in stopping 
abusers from committing further acts of domestic violence.40  One of the most 
important features of CPOs is their ability to deny an abuser access to endangered 
children.41  Many Ohio domestic court judges are in agreement that “[i]t is not just 
                                                          
 
33
 Id. at 674. 
 
34
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(1).  
 
35
 Id.  
 
36
 Id. § 3113.31(C).  
 
37
 See Mike Brigner, Civil Protection Orders in Ohio Domestic Violence Cases, 9 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS J. OHIO 37, 37 (1997) (“The Ohio DV Act . . . provides the most 
powerful [domestic violence] relief ever enacted in this state. . . . The lawyer who ignores the 
remedies of this Act when family violence is present denies the client dramatic remedies that 
no other law can provide.”).  
 
38
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(b). 
 
39
 Felton, 679 N.E.2d at 677.  A recent “bench book” issued by the State Ohio states: 
The law provides for a preferred arrest policy if a peace officer has reasonable ground 
to believe a person has committed the offense of domestic violence or the offense of 
violating a protection order or consent agreement.  Peace officers must provide 
victims with information about protection orders and domestic violence shelters.  A 
peace officer, who arrests an offender for violating a protection order or consent 
agreement that is on its face valid, is immune from liability in a civil action for 
damages.  All CPOs are enforceable throughout the state per Ohio law, and 
throughout the country per federal law.  
MIKE BRIGNER, THE OHIO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BENCHBOOK 35 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
BENCHBOOK]. 
 
40
 See Joan Zorza & Nancy K.D. Lemon, Two-Thirds of Civil Protection Orders Are 
Never Violated: Better Court and Community Services Increase Success Rates, 2 DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE REPORT 51 (1997). 
 
41
 BENCHBOOK, supra note 39, at 33. 
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physical harm to children that justifies such restrictions, but misuse of the children to 
manipulate the other parent and the court, such as past or threatened abduction.”42  
Civil protection orders issued under O.R.C. § 3113.31 afford the petitioning party 
significant advantages in addition to simply forcing the abusers to “stay away” from 
him or her.43  These advantages extend far beyond what other, more limited types of 
protective orders available under Ohio law are capable of accomplishing on behalf of 
an abused party.44  CPOs may last for years, are renewable, and their durations are 
not contingent upon the outcome of concurrent or pending judicial proceedings.45  
The statute also grants broad discretion to the courts to award various types of 
equitable relief in favor of the abused party.46  
B.  The Text of O.R.C. § 3113.31 
Under O.R.C. § 3113.31, the categories of individuals that qualify as “family or 
household member[s]” of the respondent abuser are statutorily designated and 
therefore limited.47  Subsection (A)(3) of this statute provides that “family or 
household member[s]” include: 
(a) Any of the following who is residing with or has resided with the 
respondent: 
(i) A spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former spouse of the 
respondent; 
(ii) A parent, a foster parent, or a child of the respondent, or another 
person related by consanguinity or affinity to the respondent; 
(iii) A parent or a child of a spouse, person living as a spouse, or former 
spouse of the respondent, or another person related by consanguinity or 
affinity to a spouse, person living as a spouse, or former spouse of the 
respondent. 
(b) The natural parent of any child of whom the respondent is the other 
natural parent or is the putative other natural parent.48 
The text of O.R.C. § 3113.31(A)(3) does not specifically enumerate viable, 
unborn fetuses among the various categories of “family or household members” 
                                                          
 
42
 Id.  
 
43
 See Brigner, supra note 37, at 39.  For example, unlike the vast majority of court 
petitions in the state of Ohio, there is no filing fee for a civil protection order.  Id.  
 
44
 Id. at 37.  The two other forms of restraining orders available within the state of Ohio, 
temporary restraining orders (TROs) and criminal temporary protection orders (TPOs), are not 
nearly as effective as CPOs in affording abuse victims a meaningful remedy.  They both limit 
the forms of equitable relief available to the victim and expire after any court proceedings 
against the respondent are concluded.  Id.  
 
45
 Id. at 40. 
 
46
 Id. at 40.  This equitable relief can include ordering the respondent to attend mandatory 
counseling sessions or awarding the petitioner various objects around the formerly shared 
household, like the family automobile.  Id. at 40-41.  
 
47
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(3).  
 
48
 Id. 
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capable of being protected by CPOs.49  Despite this fact, viable unborn fetuses 
should be entitled to obtain protection based upon a broad reading of the word 
“child” as found in subsections (ii) and (iii).  The validity and urgency of such an 
interpretation is supported by domestic violence statistics, case-law, scholarly 
research, and other existing Ohio statutes.  
III. AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS, CASE-LAW, SCHOLARLY 
RESEARCH, AND OHIO STATUTES SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS OF VIABLE FETUSES  
A.  The Prevalence of Domestic Violence Among Pregnant Women 
A narrow reading of the word “child” under O.R.C. § 3113.31 fails to account for 
the high occurrence of domestic abuse among pregnant women.  According to a 
recent study published in Obstetrics and Gynecology, research indicates that because 
the risk of domestic abuse to pregnant woman is so high, an “immediate need for 
[clinical] abuse assessment for all pregnant women” exists.50  Approximately 
300,000 pregnant women a year report being abused by an intimate partner,51 and 
murder remains the second-leading cause of death among pregnant women within 
the United States.52  As Professors Catherine F. Klein and Leslye E. Orloff note in 
their article, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State 
Statutes and Case Law: 
                                                          
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Judith McFarlane et al., Abuse During Pregnancy and Femicide: Urgent Implications 
for Women’s Health, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1, 27 (2002) (emphasis added). This 
study concluded further that: 
   The 821 women in this case-control study consisted of 174 women who 
survived an attempt on their life by their intimate partner (attempted femicides), 263 
women killed by their intimate partner (completed femicides), and 384 women 
physically abused or threatened with physical harm but no attempt on their life was 
made (controls).  Of the 821 women, only 687 (357 controls, 132 attempted femicides, 
and 198 completed femicides) reported ever being pregnant, thus 134 were excluded 
from the analyses. 
   The attempted and completed femicides were 3-4 years older than the controls, 
and they reported relationships lasting almost 1-3 years longer.  Nearly one-half of the 
controls were white women, compared with 22% attempted and 31% completed 
femicides.  In contrast, more than 50% attempted and 38% completed femicides were 
black, as compared with 22% controls.  The percentage of Latina women remained 
fairly constant (22-25%) over the three groups.  The majority of all women, 62-82%, 
had at least a high school education.  Similarly, most women (57-76%) were 
employed.  More than two-thirds of all women were in current relationships.  
Although only 8% of the controls reported ever being abused during pregnancy, 26% 
attempted and 23% completed femicides were abused during pregnancy.  City-to-city 
variation was evaluated and found to be minimal among the majority of the ten cities.  
Additional results revealed no significant differences among the cities when they were 
grouped by population sizes.  
Id. 
 
51
 FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 26, at 1. 
 
52
 Id.  
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Social science research demonstrates the importance of extending civil 
protection order coverage not only to parties who share a child in 
common, but also to pregnant women who are carrying the batterer’s 
child.  Data gathered on pregnancy and battering reveal that pregnant 
women face significant and increased risk of physical abuse.  Recent 
research indicates that 37% of all obstetrical patients across race, class, 
and educational lines are physically abused while pregnant.  Abuse often 
begins or escalates during pregnancy.  Among battered women, 17% have 
been physically abused during pregnancy, with 60% of those women 
reporting more than one incident.  The primary predictor of battering 
during pregnancy is prior abuse; in one study, 87.5% of women battered 
during the current pregnancy were physically abused prior to pregnancy.  
Often the worst abuse can be associated with pregnancy.  Battering during 
pregnancy increases the risk of miscarriage and low-birth weight births.  
The March of Dimes reports that more babies are born with birth defects 
as a result of the mother being battered during pregnancy than from the 
combination of all the diseases for which we immunize pregnant 
women.53 
Thus, pregnant mothers, and by extension viable fetuses, are at a heightened risk 
for domestic violence.  Though it is highly uncommon, it is not unprecedented for 
fetuses to suffer pre-natal injury separate from the mother.54  An effective CPO 
serves to decrease the risk of domestic violence posed to a pregnant mother.  
Furthermore, the simple act of adding a separate and distinct CPO for a viable fetus 
may serve as a “double warning” to potential batterers not to perpetrate acts of 
further violence against a pregnant mother.  Recent state and federal jurisprudence 
suggests that the proper and expedient way to address this issue is through the 
judiciary, and not the legislature.  
B.  Roe v. Wade 
Any discussion regarding the rights of unborn fetuses in the United States must 
be framed in the context of the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision of Roe v. 
                                                          
 
53
 Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: 
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 827-28 (1993).   
 
54
 The most common situation in which a fetus can be harmed separately from an 
expectant mother occurs when the mother ingests certain drugs that would otherwise have no 
effect on her health, such as alcohol or tobacco.  See Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp. of Port 
Jervis, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 814, 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (“[T]he medical profession is increasing 
its knowledge as to the possible adverse effects upon the fetus of various drugs and other 
ingested substances previously thought to be harmless.  Furthermore, increased use of prenatal 
diagnostic procedures . . . will require even more care on the part of the obstetrician . . . .”); In 
re Gloria C., 476 N.Y.S. 2d 991, 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) (“For example, ingestion of certain 
drugs may be entirely harmless to the mother while causing damage or even death to the 
fetus.”).  For a detailed analysis of the numerous problems that can result from pre-natal drug-
use, see Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem That 
Just Won’t Go Away, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 623, 627 (1994) (“Five to eight thousand babies 
each year are born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, although as many as 35,000 may exhibit 
alcohol-related birth defects.  Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, caused by heavy alcohol consumption 
by pregnant women, is now recognized as the leading known cause of mental retardation in 
the United States.”). 
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Wade.55  This decision famously concluded that women have a limited right to 
obtain abortions based upon an implied constitutional “right of privacy.”56  Roe 
condoned the practice of abortion from the time of conception until the point of 
“viability,” the point at which a fetus could survive outside the womb.57  The Roe 
decision made it clear that once a fetus reaches the point of viability, a state acquires 
“an important and legitimate interest [in potential life].”58  The court stated that 
“[t]his is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life 
outside the mother’s womb.  State regulation protective of fetal life after viability 
thus has both logical and biological justifications.”59 
C.  In re Ruiz 
Since this particular holding in Roe, nearly all state courts throughout the country 
have upheld statutory interpretations extending protective rights to viable, unborn 
fetuses.60  Ohio has been no exception.  Perhaps the most compelling case supporting 
the assertion that the statutory definition of “child” under O.R.C. § 3113.31 should 
be interpreted as to include viable, unborn fetuses is In re Ruiz.61  In that case, a 
newborn child was born underweight and prematurely due to the mother’s heroin use 
during pregnancy.62  The mother was subsequently charged with the criminal offense 
of child abuse under section 2919.22 of the Ohio Revised Code.63  The specific 
question before the Wood County Juvenile Court was “whether a finding that a child 
is abused may be predicated solely upon the prenatal conduct of the mother.”64  In 
order to determine the answer to that question, it was necessary for the court “to 
review the status of an unborn fetus as a ‘child’ under the child abuse statute alleged 
in the criminal complaint.”65  
                                                          
 
55
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 
56
 Id. at 153.  The Roe decision has proven to be one of the most historic, controversial, 
and debated decisions in the history of the United States Supreme Court.  For a more thorough 
and detailed analysis of the Roe v. Wade decision, see David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and 
After Roe v. Wade: A Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833 (1999).  
 
57
 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.  
 
58
 Id.   
 
59
 Id.  
 
60
 For a comprehensive overview of the legal status and rights of unborn children 
throughout the United States, see Amy Lotierzo, The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: 
Reexamining Roe in Light of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279 
(2006) (“Since the Supreme Court announced the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, there has 
been an increasing recognition and expansion of the rights of unborn children in various areas 
of the law . . . .”).  
 
61
 In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986). 
 
62
 Id. at 936.   
 
63
 Id.  
 
64
 Id. at 935-36.  
 
65
 Id. at 936. 
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The court ultimately concluded that a viable fetus was indeed a child within the 
meaning of this particular statute.66  It based its ruling on several considerations.  
First, the court recognized that viable fetuses were already afforded various other 
rights under Ohio law.67  For example, statutes governing descent and distribution 
recognized an unborn child’s right to inherit property.68  Next, the court noted that a 
variety of different tort actions were also actionable against those who harmed viable 
fetuses.69  Yet, the most persuasive consideration that favored the court’s 
interpretation was the influence of the then recently rendered decision of Roe v. 
Wade.70  According to the court, Roe was a signal to lower courts that they were 
entitled to take action in order to protect viable fetuses from danger.71 
In light of clear judicial precedent supplied by both Roe and Ruiz, it is logical to 
conclude that Ohio courts are fully empowered to interpret domestic violence 
statutes in order to protect viable, unborn fetuses from physical harm.  Expanding the 
meaning of the word “child” under O.R.C. § 3113.31 would prevent domestic 
abusers from getting anywhere close to a threatened fetus.  The Tenth District Court 
of Appeals failed to properly use its inherent authority when it denied Smith’s 
request to add her fetus as a party within her CPO. 
D.  In re Baby Boy Blackshear 
Another Ohio case that stands for the proposition that viable fetuses should be 
afforded certain vital protective rights within our society is In re Baby Boy 
Blackshear.72  The facts of that case involved an infant born addicted to cocaine as a 
result of his mother’s drug use during pregnancy.73  Upon discovering that the child 
was addicted, the delivering hospital staff contacted the local department of human 
services.74  The department subsequently filed a dependency and neglect petition 
against the mother under section 2151.27 of the Ohio Revised Code and took 
custody of the child.75  The mother then sued to reclaim custody of her child.76  At 
                                                          
 
66
 Id. at 939. 
 
67
 Id. at 936. 
 
68
 Id. at 937.  Current Ohio statutes extending limited rights to viable fetuses will be 
discussed later in this section. 
 
69
 Id. at 936-37. 
 
70
 Id. at 938.  
 
71
 Id. (“The essence of Roe, the state’s interest in the potential human life at the time of 
viability, in conjunction with Ohio’s developing case law, compels a holding that a viable 
unborn fetus is to be considered a child under the provisions of R.C. 2151.031.”). 
 
72
 In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000).  
 
73
 Id.  
 
74
 Id.  The county human services department had previously intervened two years earlier, 
when the mother gave birth to her first cocaine-addicted newborn.  Id. at 463 n.1. 
 
75
 Id. at 462-63.  This statute states in pertinent part: 
[A]ny person having knowledge of a child who appears to . . . be an unruly, abused, 
neglected, or dependent child may file a sworn complaint with respect to that child in 
the juvenile court of the county in which the child has a residence or legal settlement 
or in which the . . . unruliness, abuse, neglect, or dependency allegedly occurred.  
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trial, the mother challenged the actions of the department of human services, arguing 
that an unborn fetus was not an abused “child” under section 2151.031 of the Ohio 
Revised Code.77  Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate court found that 
a fetus addicted to cocaine was, indeed, an abused “child” within the meaning of 
section 2151.27 of the Ohio Revised Code.78  
On final appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of the department of 
human services, albeit on narrower grounds.79  The court stated that it “[did] not 
agree with [plaintiff] in either how she has framed the issue or her interpretation of 
the statute.  Accordingly, we find that the issue is not whether a fetus is a child but 
rather whether the plain language of R.C. 2151.031(D) applies to [the newborn].”80  
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not go so far as to say that a fetus was a 
“child” under section 2151.27 of the Ohio Revised Code, it did hold that “when a 
newborn child’s toxicology screen yields a positive result for an illegal drug due to 
prenatal maternal drug abuse, the newborn is, for purposes of R.C. 2151.031(D), per 
se an abused child.”81 
This decision is important because it underscores the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
interest in ensuring that Ohio’s newborns are kept safe from harm during and after 
childbirth.  As the dissent noted, “[a] positive result on a newborn’s drug screen is 
probative evidence of in utero exposure to illegal drugs.  Whether a newborn’s in 
utero exposure to an illegal substance actually harms or threatens to harm the child 
is, however, a separate question . . . .”82  Thus, even though the court did not equate 
fetuses with children, the Ohio Supreme Court still went to great lengths to see that 
newborns were ultimately protected by the statute.  The court mentioned that the 
case was “a civil proceeding . . . [and] not subject to the strict construction rule.  In 
fact, in this case the opposite is true because R.C. 2151.01 mandates the court to 
liberally construe and interpret the sections of R.C. Chapter 2151, so as to provide 
for the care and protection of children . . . .”83  The court went on to state that: 
It is clear, and there can be no doubt, that an alleged abused child, once 
born, falls under the jurisdiction of the appropriate juvenile court.  It is 
clear that a child has legal and constitutional rights and that juvenile 
courts were created, in part, to protect those rights and to empower the 
state to provide for the care and protection of Ohio’s children.  It is clear 
that there can be no more sacred or precious right of a newborn infant 
                                                          
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A)(1). 
 
76
 Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d at 463. 
 
77
 Id.  
 
78
 Id.  
 
79
 Id. at 464. 
 
80
 Id.  
 
81
 Id. at 465. 
 
82
 Id. at 466.  (Cook, J., dissenting).  Justice Cook would have remanded the case back to 
the trial court for a determination of whether or not the cocaine in the newborn’s system had 
actually “harmed him.”  Id.  
 
83
 Id. at 464 (majority opinion).  
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than the right to life and to begin that life, where medically possible, 
healthy, and uninjured.  And it is clear that to ignore these facts, these 
rights, and the numerous problems presented in these cases is to place our 
collective heads in the proverbial sand and hope that the vexing questions 
will somehow just disappear.  Well, they will not!84 
This language openly challenges lower courts to address the visible gaps that 
exist in legislation pertinent to the safety of newborns.  The court Smith v. Martin 
failed to adequately establish a safe environment for Smith’s baby by not heeding 
this dictum. 
E.  Werling v. Sandy 
The 1985 Ohio Supreme Court case of Werling v. Sandy also stands as a 
challenge to the notion that courts are somehow powerless to interpret standing laws 
broadly, thereby giving viable fetuses legal standing.85  In Werling, a pregnant 
mother’s baby was delivered stillborn due to an oversight by her hospital.86  The 
mother then brought a wrongful death action against both her doctors and the 
hospital, claiming both had been negligent.87  The trial court issued summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, stating that no such cause of action existed for a 
viable fetus delivered stillborn.88  The appellate court affirmed the trial court on the 
same grounds, yet certified the issue for the Ohio Supreme Court.89 
                                                          
 
84
 Id. at 465. 
 
85
 Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985). 
 
86
 Id. at 1053. 
  Appellant became pregnant during the summer months of 1980.  She soon after 
consulted Drs. Sandy and Thompson for the necessary obstetrical care.  The 
physicians initially determined that appellant was an increased labor risk due to her 
obesity.  While her medical history also included nephritis and hypertension, appellant 
was examined by the physicians on fifteen occasions during her pregnancy and did not 
have any serious complications associated therewith.           
  Appellant admitted herself to the hospital on the evening of April 30, 1981.  She 
was under the supervision of Dr. Thompson by the early morning hours of the next 
day.  A fetal monitor was attached to her body in order to evaluate the heartbeat of the 
fetus.  All parties hereto agree that the nine-to-ten-month-old fetus was alive and 
viable just prior to delivery. 
  However, prior to the decedent’s birth, Dr. Thompson left the hospital to deliver 
another baby.  Appellant remained in the labor room and her condition was monitored 
by the hospital’s nursing staff.  Without prior warning, the fetal monitor indicated that 
the baby’s heart was no longer functioning.  The only surgeon in the hospital was 
unavailable as he was in surgery with another patient.  Upon completion of the 
operation, the surgeon examined appellant and ordered her prepped for surgery.  
Monica Jane was subsequently delivered stillborn by the surgeon.  
Id. 
 
87
 Id. 
 
88
 Id.  
 
89
 Id. at 1053-54. 
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The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower courts’ holdings.90  
After surveying Ohio’s long history of extending certain legal rights to viable 
fetuses, the court concluded that “[i]t is logically indefensible as well as unjust to 
deny an action where the child is stillborn, and yet permit the action where the child 
survives birth but only for a short period of time.  The requirement of birth in this 
respect is an artificial demarcation.”91  The court invoked the language of Roe to 
support its holding, stating that:  
 
The [Roe] court found the compelling point in the state’s legitimate 
interest of protecting potential life to be at viability . . . It follows, 
therefore, that our decision is entirely consistent with Roe to the effect 
that a viable fetus is a person entitled to protection and may be a basis for 
recovery under the wrongful death statute.92 
 
The birth of a child in a CPO case can likewise be seen as a line of “artificial 
demarcation.”  If there exists a chance that a newborn may be seriously threatened 
by an abuser, then what difference does it make precisely when the child is born?  
The safety risks at stake were captured accurately by the Werling court when it 
quoted the following passage: 
To hold that the plaintiff [child] in the instant case did not suffer an 
injury in her person would require this court to announce that as a matter 
of law the infant is a part of the mother until birth and has no existence in 
law until that time.  In our view such a ruling would deprive the infant of 
the right conferred by the Constitution upon all persons, by the 
application of a time-worn fiction not founded on fact and within common 
knowledge untrue and unjustified.93 
F.  In re Gloria C.  
At least one other state’s court has chosen to judicially interpret its state CPO 
statute to include unborn, viable fetuses.  In In re Gloria C., a New York family 
court concluded that “an order of protection may issue to an unborn child where such 
is requested by the natural mother and the fetus is within a zone of danger amenable 
to legal redress.”94  The case involved a predicament very similar to Gabrielle 
Smith’s.95  In analyzing New York’s CPO statute,96 the court stated that “[t]he 
                                                          
 
90
 Id. at 1057.  
 
91
 Id. at 1055 (emphasis added). 
 
92
 Id. at 1056. 
 
93
 Id. at 1055 (quoting Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ohio 
1949)). 
 
94
 In re Gloria C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991, 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984). 
 
95
 The court in this case stated the facts as follows:  
  The natural mother has initiated this proceeding pursuant to article 8 of the Family 
Court Act.  By verified petition, dated March 29, 1984, she alleges that her husband 
assaulted her three times, hitting her in the head, punching her in the stomach, and 
throwing her onto the floor.  Petitioner is four months pregnant.  She has two children, 
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availability of this sanction [which may be imposed for violation of the order] adds a 
significant dimension of protection to an unborn child who has received an order of 
protection in its own right.”97  The court’s opinion noted that, because the purpose of 
the CPO statute was to “stop the violence, [and] end the family disruption,” 
preventing harm to developing fetuses was vital.98  Like the Ruiz opinion, it too 
recognized that both the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Roe and previous state 
case-law gave credence to its position.99  
G.  In re Dittrick Infant 
Other states that have addressed the issue of extending CPO protection to viable 
fetuses have been less willing to do so.  The 1977 case In re Dittrick Infant 
represents Michigan’s attempt to grapple with the language of its own CPO 
statute.100  In that case, a rural Michigan county’s department of social services took 
emergency protective custody of an abusive couple’s “child.”101  At the time that the 
protective custody order was rendered, the “child” in question was still 45 days away 
from being born.102  The parents challenged the validity of the protective custody 
order on jurisdictional grounds.103 
The Michigan Court of Appeals found in favor of the parents.104  First, the court 
critically evaluated the meaning of the world “child” within Michigan’s CPO 
statute.105  Although the court “recognize[d] that the word ‘child’ could be read as 
applying even to unborn persons” it stated that “[its] reading of other sections of 
Chapter XIIA of the Probate Code convinces [the court] that the Legislature did not 
                                                          
ages 5 and 1 1/2, and she alleges that respondent threatened to take the younger child 
away from her. . . . The petitioner informed the Department of Probation that the 
respondent has a history of psychiatric problems and has told her he was trying to 
force her to have a spontaneous abortion.  
Id. at 991 & n.1. 
 
96
 See N.Y. FAMILY LAW § 812 (Consol. 2009). 
 
97
 In re Gloria C., 476 N.Y.S.2d at 992.  
 
98
 Id.  
 
99
 Id. at 996 (“This significant State interest [in protecting the fetus] is present during the 
entire pregnancy, though it does not become sufficiently compelling to override the woman’s 
privacy right until (viability) about the third trimester.” (quoting Roe. v. Wade, 40 U.S. 113, 
162 (1973)). 
 
100
 In re Dittrick Infant, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). 
 
101
 Id. at 38.  
 
102
 Id.  
 
103
 Id. at 39.  Like the mother in In re Baby Boy Blackshear, the parents in this case had a 
prior history of abusing their other children.  The record showed that “the defendants’ parental 
rights over defendant Carol Dittrick’s first child were permanently terminated in May of 1976, 
following allegations of continuing physical and sexual abuse.  Criminal charges against both 
defendants are now pending as a result of those abuse allegations.”  Id. at 38.  
 
104
 Id. at 39. 
 
105
 Id. 
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intend application of these provisions to unborn children.”106  Although the court 
essentially punted the responsibility of resolving the issue to the Michigan 
legislature, it added that “the background of the present case has convinced us that 
such amendments [to expand the meaning of ‘child’] would be desirable.”107  The 
court further stated:  
Although the plaintiff Bay County Department of Social Services and the 
probate court acted without proper authority, we nevertheless believe that 
their actions were “correct” in the sense that the best interests of all 
concerned required that the defendants’ infant not be left in defendants’ 
custody.  While we have ruled in the defendants’ favor on the legal 
question raised, we do not intend to cause an immediate change of 
custody back to the defendants.  We therefore order that the present 
custody arrangement shall remain in effect until 60 days after the release 
date of this opinion.  This will allow sufficient time for a proper 
invocation of probate court jurisdiction in the event that plaintiff Bay 
County Department of Social Services believes that the parental home is 
still an unfit residence.108 
H.  In re Melissa Woodin 
Minnesota courts have likewise chosen to narrowly interpret the meaning of the 
word “child” within their state’s CPO statute.  In re Melissa Woodin raised the 
question: “Does [a] trial court have jurisdiction to issue a protective order under [its 
domestic violence statute] when the parties have never been married, have never 
lived together, have no children in common, yet do have an unborn child claimed to 
be in common?”109  There, a pregnant mother was in an abusive relationship almost 
identical to Gabrielle Smith’s, with the exception that the mother and the father of 
the unborn child had never lived together.110  The mother had filed for a CPO on 
behalf of her unborn child.111  Instead of being denied coverage by the trial court, the 
petitioning mother was granted full CPO coverage for her fetus.112 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals overturned the trial court, finding that 
“[b]ecause an ‘unborn child’ in common is not included as one of the relationships 
which would support issuance of a domestic abuse order, we conclude that the 
legislature did not intend to extend the protections of the act to these 
                                                          
 
106
 Id.  
 
107
 Id.  
 
108
 Id. (citation omitted). 
 
109
 In re Melissa Woodin, 455 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 
110
 At the October 11, 1989 trial hearing on the mother’s petition, the mother testified that 
she was twenty years old and lived with her parents.  Id.  Her testimony further indicated that 
she became pregnant in June 1989 and that the father of her fetus threatened her with bodily 
harm and to kill her, making her fearful for herself and her unborn child.  Id.   
 
111
 Id.  
 
112
 Id.  
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circumstances.”113  Like the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Minnesota court also 
conceded that:  
In reaching this decision we are not unmindful that the type of 
continuing contact that accompanies a familial or household relationship 
may occur when two individuals have an unborn child in common.  The 
legislature may wish to extend the Act to include unborn children in 
common as a basis for protection under the Act.114 
Both Dittrick Infant and Melissa Woodin, like the opinion of the Ohio Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, stand for the proposition that legislative intent should take 
precedence over the safety of mothers.  Both opinions rule against interpreting the 
word “child” broadly within their respective CPO statutes.  Yet, strikingly, both 
opinions also recognize the vital safety risks inherent in a narrow interpretation of 
the statutes.115  Each court actually encourages its state legislature to amend the 
obvious safety gaps created by the prevailing construction of their statutes.116  The 
Dittrick Infant court went as far as to call a broad interpretation of the word “child” 
the “correct” one under the circumstances.117  The court then proscribed further 
protective measures in order to ensure the safety of the endangered child.118  The 
Michigan and Minnesota appellate courts “bent over backwards” to give deference to 
their respective state legislatures.  Rather than pontificating about the serious safety 
concerns created by the narrow construction of the statute, they could have simply 
invoked the language of Roe to use appropriate measures “to protect potential life.” 
I.  Scholarly Support 
Numerous legal commentators have recognized that viable fetuses should be 
entitled to independent and separate protective rights.119  Some scholars would go so 
far as to advocate that the line of demarcation for fetal rights should be the point of 
                                                          
 
113
 Id. at 537.  
 
114
 Id.  
 
115
 In re Dittrick, 263 N.W.2d at 39; In re Melissa Woodin, 455 N.W.2d at 536.  
 
116
 In re Dittrick, 263 N.W.2d at 39; In re Melissa Woodin, 455 N.W.2d at 536.  
 
117
 In re Dittrick, 263 N.W.2d at 39. 
 
118
 Id.  The court issued the following instruction: 
While we have ruled in the defendants’ favor on the legal question raised, we do not 
intend to cause an immediate change of custody back to the defendants.  We therefore 
order that the present custody arrangement shall remain in effect until 60 days after 
the release date of this opinion.  This will allow sufficient time for a proper invocation 
of probate court jurisdiction in the event that plaintiff Bay County Department of 
Social Services believes that the parental home is still an unfit residence. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
 
119
 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the 
Unborn’s Potentiality for Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982); Mamta K. Shah, Inconsistencies 
in the Legal Status of an Unborn Child: Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 931 (2001). 
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conception, rather than viability.120  As Professors Jeffrey A. Parness and Susan K. 
Pritchard note, “[t]he failure to understand the Roe decision has led . . . to courts 
mistakenly denying the unborn non-fourteenth amendment protections to which the 
unborn are entitled.”121  Particularly persuasive is the work of Professor John. E. B. 
Myers.  In his article, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 
Myers poses the question: “When, if ever, can the state intervene in the life of a 
pregnant woman to curtail abuse and neglect of her unborn child?”122  The Ruiz court 
seized on Myers’ answer to this question in formulating its opinion: 
“The important state interests in preservation of life, the potentiality of 
life, and child welfare lend resolute support to the argument that child 
abuse and neglect statutes should include unborn children.  In reality, this 
is the only way to give meaningful effect to those interests.  An interest 
stripped of a method of enforcement is a feckless thing.  Nowhere in law 
are significant state interests unaccompanied by a means of 
implementation.  This is certainly true where the state seeks to prevent 
death or serious bodily injury.  The only reasonable mechanism to 
implement state interests in the unborn is through existing abuse and 
neglect statutes. . . . Since these statutes can be construed to include the 
unborn, protection of legitimate state interests calls for such an 
interpretation. . . . Doing so will nourish important state interests, and 
extend long overdue legal protection to the unborn.”123 
J.  Statutory Support 
The Werling decision made it plain that, in Ohio, “[t]he rights of an unborn child 
are no strangers to our law.”124  Section 2105.14 of the Ohio Revised Code 
                                                          
120
 Shah, supra note 119, at 969.  
  The legal system has determined the extent to which a fetus should be protected 
under civil and criminal law by balancing various factors such as legislative intent, 
rules of statutory construction, the purpose of wrongful death liability and homicide 
convictions, logic, precedent, and changes in medical science.  As demonstrated in 
this Note, applying a comparable methodology leads to the conclusion that the legal 
personality of potential life should commence at the moment of potentiality, namely 
conception.  While courts, legislatures, scientists, and philosophers may never be able 
to resolve the question as to whether a fetus is a “person,” extending the protections 
granted to a human being to a fetus, as a potential human life, from the moment of 
conception will provide consistency in the law, more effectively fulfill the social 
framework under which the legal status of a fetus is evaluated, and coincide with our 
innate reactions that a fetus has value, even though we are unable to exactly identify 
why or what. 
Id.  Such a stance would surely make fetal rights more clear cut, yet it is highly likely that 
such a determination would prove very controversial to the American public.  
 
121
 Parness & Pritchard, supra note 119, at 258. 
 
122
 John E. B. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).  
 
123
 In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 938 (Ohio C.P. 1986) (quoting Myers, supra note 122, at 
29). 
 
124
 Werling, 476 N.E.2d at 1054. 
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recognizes that “[d]escendants of an intestate begotten before his death, but born 
thereafter, in all cases will inherit as if born in the lifetime of the intestate and 
surviving him.”125  Ohio Revised Code section 2131.08(A) dictates that a child in 
gestation is a living person for the purposes of Ohio’s rule terminating 
perpetuities,126 while section 2108.01(D) states in pertinent part that “‘[d]ecedent’ 
means a deceased individual whose body or part is or may be the source of an 
anatomical gift.  The term includes a stillborn infant and, subject to restrictions 
imposed by law other than sections 2108.01 to 2108.29 of the Revised Code, a 
fetus.”127  Most of these Ohio probate statutes are the result of the influence from the 
Uniform Probate Code,128 a model set of statutes designed “to shorten and simplify 
the probate of estates” throughout the country.129 
Beyond the realm of probate law, viable fetuses are granted additional statutory 
rights within Ohio.  The State’s aggravated murder statute recognizes that the 
“unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy” is on the same footing as killing a 
living person.130  Section 2919.18 of the Ohio Revised Code makes it a crime for a 
doctor to generally “perform or induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion 
upon a pregnant woman after the beginning of her twenty-second week of 
pregnancy.”131  A noticeable hallmark of this statutory language is its reliance on the 
“viability” determination.132  This could be the result of the Roe decision, which 
preceded the enactment of the legislation.133   
What statutes like these demonstrate is that over the last couple of decades 
lawmakers and citizens from the state of Ohio have come to recognize the “timeworn 
fiction” of the indivisibility of mother and unborn child until the point of birth.134  
Jurists in favor of judicial deference to the Ohio General Assembly would likely 
posit that a “broad” reading of O.R.C. § 3113.31 is not acceptable, because the 
people of the Ohio have not given their consent for such an interpretation.135  
However, this argument fails to comprehend the subtlety of the danger posed by a 
narrow interpretation of O.R.C. § 3113.31.  Unlike the fetal protection amendment to 
the aggravated murder statute, which was by and large spurned into enactment by an 
                                                          
 
125
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14.  Ohio courts have recognized that “[a] bequest to 
children of testatrix or of some person who is indicated in the will, includes a child en ventre 
sa mere; since it is considered as a child in existence for all beneficial purposes.”  Ebbs v. 
Smith, 394 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1979). 
 
126
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(A). 
 
127
 Id. § 2108.01(D). 
 
128
 Lotierzo, supra note 60, at 292.  
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obvious “gap” in the Ohio Revised Code, it is not readily apparent to voters and 
legislators that lapses in CPO coverage are likely to occur from the current 
construction of O.R.C. § 3113.31.  It is, therefore, unlikely that lawmakers will be 
pressed to change the law through the legislature.  This reality highlights the urgency 
of a broad judicial construction of Ohio’s domestic violence statute.  As previously 
noted, “[s]ince [existing] statutes can be construed to include the unborn, protection 
of legitimate state interests calls for such an interpretation.”136 
Admittedly, as long as a pregnant mother has a valid CPO herself, a viable fetus 
is virtually assured adequate protection from an abusive family member.  Even the In 
re Gloria C. court recognized that “almost every act injurious or potentially injurious 
to the unborn child would, at the same time, be similarly offensive to the 
[mother].”137  Thus, according to the Smith court, the value of any CPO obtained on 
behalf of a viable fetus would be essentially redundant until the child’s birth.138  Yet, 
this narrow interpretation of O.R.C. § 3113.31 fails to address vital post-pregnancy 
safety concerns involving the child.  The following sections will explain some of 
these concerns and illustrate how a broader reading of the statute serves to address 
them.  
IV. HOW THE ISSUES OF MATERNAL MORBIDITY AND CHILD ABDUCTION ILLUSTRATE 
THE SAFETY CONCERNS CREATED BY A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF O.R.C. § 
3113.31 
A.  An Overview of the Issue of Maternal Morbidity 
Currently, there is no uniform definition for maternal morbidity.  One of the 
World Health Organization’s current working definitions is: “[a]ny departure, 
subjective or objective, from a state of physiological or psychological well-being 
during pregnancy, childbirth and the post-partum period.”139  Maternal post-partum 
health complications present great challenges for healthcare professionals and 
mothers across the United States.  A recent study published by the American Journal 
of Public Health concluded that for childbearing mothers “the burden of total 
morbidity is high.”140  The study found that “[m]aternal morbidity is a public health 
problem that affects nearly 1.7 million women annually, [and] can have an impact on 
fetal and infant health.”141  According to the study, approximately thirty-one percent 
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 Myers, supra note 122, at 29.    
 
137
 In re Gloria C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991, 992 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984). 
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 See Smith v. Martin, No. 08AP-692, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2955, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 14, 2009). 
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 U.K. ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GRP. ON POPULATION, DEV., AND REPROD. HEALTH, 
BETTER OFF DEAD? A REPORT ON MATERNAL MORBIDITY 9 (2009) (emphasis added).   
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 Isabella Danel et al., Magnitude of Maternal Morbidity During Labor and Delivery: 
United States, 1993–1997, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 631, 633 (2003).  The report further stated 
that “[t]he present study is the first, to our knowledge, to involve the use of population based 
data to summarize the prevalence of maternal morbidity during labor and delivery 
hospitalizations in the United States.  The results show that the magnitude of the problem is 
greater than generally appreciated.”  Id.  
 
141
 Id.  
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of all child-bearing American women experience some form of post-partum health 
complications.142  Thousands of these women experience serious and life-threatening 
health problems.143  
This information indicates that it is still common in America for mothers to be 
incapacitated as a result of pregnancy.  Some of the most extreme medical problems 
resulting from pregnancy often require months of intensive rehabilitation.144  In 
many instances, post-partum health complications could make it impossible for an 
abused mother to be near her newborn child.  In such situations, an infant child 
would not enjoy sufficient legal protection from the threats of violence or abduction 
committed by an abuser.  A mother’s CPO would be of no value to an endangered 
child if he or she were not in close proximity to the mother.  
The preceding data regarding the prevalence of post-partum health complications 
illustrates one of a multitude of situations in which a mother could be temporarily 
separated from her newborn.  A child could just as easily be threatened while 
entrusted to the care of a babysitter, relative, or daycare center.145  Any situation 
requiring the mother to be temporarily away from the child would create a similar 
lapse in protection.  
B.  An Overview of the Issue of Parental Kidnapping 
The danger posed by such a lapse in court-ordered protection is not mere 
conjecture.  According to experts on the psychology of sexual victimization, 
“[b]atterers often abduct children as the ultimate weapon against their partners, 
especially following separation where abduction or the threat of abduction is the 
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143
 Id.  
 
144
 For example, Eclampsia, or pregnancy related hypertension, as well as birth-related 
maternal hemorrhaging can both require serious and long-term medical attention.  See K.A. 
Douglas & C.W.G. Redman, Eclampsia in the United Kingdom, 309 BRIT. J. MED. 1395 
(1994); STATE OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF HEALTH, HEALTH ADVISORY: PREVENTION OF 
MATERNAL DEATHS THROUGH IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OF HEMORRHAGE (2004).  
 
145
 The rates of children receiving child care from someone other than their biological 
mother is extremely high in the United States.  A publication on the Federal Interagency 
Forum on Child and Family Statistics provides: 
  In 2005, 61 percent of children ages 0–6 who were not yet in kindergarten (about 12 
million children) received some form of child care on a regular basis from persons 
other than their parents.  This is about the same proportion of children in child care as 
in 1995.   
  Patterns of child care vary by the poverty status of the child’s family.  In 2005, 
children ages 0–6 in families with incomes at least twice the poverty level were more 
likely than children in families with incomes below the poverty level and children in 
families with incomes 100–199 percent of the poverty level to be in nonparental care 
(68 percent versus 51 and 53 percent, respectively).  In addition, children in families 
with incomes at least twice the poverty level were more likely than children in 
families with lower incomes to be in home care by a nonrelative or in center-based 
programs such as nursery schools and other early childhood education programs. 
America’s Children: Key National Indicators of Well-Being, CHILDSTATS.GOV, 
http://childstats.gov/americaschildren/famsoc3.asp#18 (last visited Jan 13, 2011). 
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only ‘battering technique’ left.”146  Accordingly, there are “direct links among family 
violence, child abuse, and parental kidnapping.”147   
According to the American Bar Association, “[t]he term ‘parental kidnapping’ 
encompasses the taking, retention or concealment of a child by a parent, other family 
member, or their agent, in derogation of the custody rights, including visitation 
rights, of another parent or family member.”148  In 1988, parents or family members 
abducted an estimated 354,100 children in the United States.149  The U.S. 
Department of Justice has stated that “[f]amily abductions constitute an important 
peril in the lives of children, particularly children living in households without one 
of their biological parents.”150  
Fathers commit the vast majority of such abductions,151 and the most vulnerable 
child victims of family abduction are under the age of six.152  Scholars have noted 
that fathers usually kidnap “either because they have lost, or fear they will lose, 
custody of the child in a court proceeding or because they want to retaliate against 
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 MICHELE ANTOINETTE PALUDI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION: A 
HANDBOOK 189 (1999).  
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 Id. at 188. 
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 PATRICIA M. HOFF, PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: PREVENTION AND REMEDIES 1 (2000), 
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 Id.  
 
150
 HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., CHILDREN ABDUCTED BY FAMILY MEMBERS: NATIONAL 
ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 9 (2002).  
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 Id. at 2.  
 
152
 Id.  
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the other parent.”153  The most dangerous parental kidnappers will use weapons and 
physical force in order to abduct their children.154  
C.  How These Factors Combine to Allow Abusive Fathers to Exploit the Narrow 
Interpretation of O.R.C. § 3113.31 
If a newborn child is separated from its mother and is thereby unprotected by a 
CPO, an abusive father has no legal disincentive to commit child abduction.  In fact, 
if the abusive father is still married to the mother, there is almost nothing restricting 
him from legally taking the child into his custody.  In Ohio, the local agency charged 
with juvenile protection may obtain custody of a child upon a finding that the child 
is “abused.”155  However, before an abusive parent can be stripped of custody, an 
independent complaint must be filed with that agency.156  Thus, even though the 
local agency is empowered to deny a married, abusive father child custody of a 
newborn child, it is only able to do so after a lengthy fact-finding process.157  Such 
proceedings would not be a deterrent to a married, abusive father determined to take 
swift control of his newborn son or daughter.  
The only other means of determining custodial rights in Ohio are divorce, legal 
separation, and annulment proceedings.158  If such proceedings have not been 
                                                          
 
153
 Richard A. Campbell, Transition: The Tort of Custodial Interference—Toward A More 
Complete Remedy to Parental Kidnappings, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 231 (1983).  Campbell 
does an excellent job summarizing the incredible emotional tolls that parental kidnappings can 
exact upon families: 
  Parental kidnapping causes great problems for both the custodial parent and the 
child.  The custodial parent attempting to locate and recover a “stolen” child faces a 
grim task.  At least twenty percent of the children stolen by noncustodial parents are 
never found.  The custodial parent may spend an average of $ 20,000 trying to locate 
and regain custody of the child.  In addition, parents who lose a child to a parental 
kidnapper often blame themselves for the kidnapping.  These parets [sic] also may 
suffer great anguish which can cause physical and emotional problems resulting in 
physical or psychological injury.  
  Parental kidnapping also harms the kidnapped child.  Children, the real victims of 
this act, can suffer emotional and psychological harm when one parent forcefully 
takes them away from the other parent.  Further damage to the children can occur if 
they are later uprooted and returned to the custodial parent after many years.  The 
increasing number of parental kidnappings and the great damage done to the victims 
of this act combine to make parental kidnapping a significant problem facing our 
nation. 
Id. at 231-33.  
 
154
 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 150, at 8. 
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 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353; see also id. § 2151.031 (defining an “abused child” 
for the purposes of this statute). 
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 See FRANKLIN CNTY. CHILDREN SERVS., GUIDELINES: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 14 (2009) (explaining the lengthy juvenile protective guidelines 
for Gabrielle Smith’s jurisdiction). 
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 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (“In any divorce, legal separation, or annulment 
proceeding and in any proceeding pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and 
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initiated by an abused wife and her newborn child is not mentioned in a pre-existing 
CPO, the abusive father is fully entitled to take the child if separated from its 
mother.159  Such a result is clearly perilous to the safety and welfare of newborn 
children, because it allows abusers free reign to perpetrate further acts of violence 
against them.  
Including viable fetuses under O.R.C. § 3113.31 would prevent such tragedies 
from occurring.  If a pregnant mother knew that her abuser would be inclined to 
harm or abduct her anticipated newborn, she could file for a protective order on its 
behalf.  With her child protected under a CPO, the mother would be assured that the 
safety of her child would not be compromised if she were rendered incapacitated as a 
result of the pregnancy or if she simply needed to temporarily leave her child in the 
care of another.  Likewise, if the mother was still married to her abuser, she could be 
certain that his access to her son or daughter would be properly restricted. 
V. HOW A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF O.R.C. § 3113.31 FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR 
CHILD SAFETY CONCERNS OCCURRING WHEN A MOTHER IS COERCED INTO 
RETURNING TO HER ABUSER 
A narrow reading of O.R.C. § 3113.31 also fails to account for situations in 
which battered mothers “reconcile” with abusers who still pose a threat to the 
mother’s children.  Studies have shown that battered women are often coerced by 
their abusers into continuing harmful relationships.160  Such behavior is usually 
recognized as a step in the cycle known as “battered women’s syndrome.”161  
Battered women’s syndrome is characterized by a state of “learned helplessness” 
stemming from sustained domestic abuse.162  A recent article in Psychiatric Times 
noted:  
It is . . . understood that gender violence is fostered by the 
socialization of men to be more powerful than women.  In some men, this 
process creates the need to abuse power and to control women.   While the 
term “victim” is not always considered politically correct, in fact, until 
battered women take back some control over their lives, they may not 
truly be considered survivors.  Psychological symptoms, called battered 
woman syndrome (BWS), develop in some women and make it difficult 
for them to regain control.163  
                                                          
responsibilities for the care of a child . . . the court shall allocate the parental rights and 
responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage.”). 
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 Id. § 3109.03 (“When husband and wife are living separate and apart from each other 
. . . they shall stand upon an equality as to the parental rights and responsibilities for the care 
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parenthood is involved.”). 
 
160
 See LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 127 (2d ed. 2000).  
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 Lenore E. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome: Key Elements of a Diagnosis and 
Treatment Plan, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, July 7, 2009, at 1.  
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In such circumstances, a mother might even attempt to terminate her CPO in 
order to placate her abuser.  The New Jersey case of Stevenson v. Stevenson is 
illustrative of such a situation.164  There, a woman tried to terminate her existing 
CPO against her husband, despite the fact that he had very recently beaten her 
brutally.165  The court denied the woman’s request to terminate the CPO, recognizing 
that the court had broad discretion in making such a determination.166  The court 
stated: 
Plaintiff’s dissolution request, made despite the latest brutal beating 
she suffered at the hands of a drunken husband who has a past history of 
wife-beating and an alcohol abuse problem, is consistent with phase three 
of “the battered woman’s syndrome.”  That phase of the battering cycle is 
characterized by a period of loving behavior by the batterer, during which 
pleas for forgiveness and protestations of devotion are often mixed with 
promises to seek counseling, stop drinking and refrain from further 
violence.  A period of relative calm may last as long as several months, 
but in a battering relationship the affection and contrition of the batterer 
will eventually fade, and phases one and two, the “tension-building” 
phase and the “acute battering incident” phase, will start anew.167 
Similarly, Ohio domestic courts have the power to review any motion to 
terminate a CPO.  Several factors that the court may consider in determining whether 
to grant or deny such a motion are set forth in section 3113.31(D)(8)(c) of the Ohio 
Revised Code.168  These factors include whether the petitioner consents to the 
termination, whether the petitioner fears the respondent, and the overall nature of the 
relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.169  A court may deny the 
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 Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998). 
 
165
 Id. at 988.  Abused mothers are often willing to rescind CPOs even after sustaining the 
most brutal forms of domestic violence.  This case was no exception: 
  On November 6, 1997, the parties appeared before this court for a hearing on 
plaintiff’s complaint charging defendant with numerous violations of the Prevention 
of Domestic Violence Act (the Act).  The testimony of plaintiff, the photographic 
exhibits offered by her counsel, and the graphic appearance at the hearing of the 
residual effects  of the severe physical injuries she suffered, established by a clear 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant was guilty of attempted criminal 
homicide, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, criminal restraint and burglary, all in 
violation of the Act.  These violations arose from a brutal, sadistic and prolonged 
attack by defendant on his wife during the late evening and early morning hours of 
October 29-30, 1997.  The uncontroverted facts showed that during a drunken rage, 
defendant beat and tortured his wife so severely that she was critically injured, and 
had to be medevac’d by emergency helicopter to the Cooper Hospital Trauma Unit in 
Camden. 
Id.  
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motion if the moving party does not show that a termination is appropriate under the 
circumstances.170  Thus, if a judge senses that a battered mother is being coerced or 
threatened into terminating the CPO, he or she may deny the request.171 
Yet, there is nothing in O.R.C. § 3113.31 that would require a coerced mother to 
modify her CPO to extend protection to a newborn.  The In re Gloria C. court 
recognized that, “in the ordinary course of events, any violation of an order 
protecting the fetus would be dependent upon an adult, presumably the mother, filing 
a petition for redress on the fetus’ behalf.”172  If a battered mother is under the 
domination of an abusive male, she will most likely refrain from including her 
expected baby within her pre-existing CPO.  In such situations, the mother would 
become an instrument in exposing her child to further abuse.  
A broad interpretation of O.R.C. § 3113.31 would avoid such a calamity by 
treating unborn, viable fetuses the same as children already living within a 
household.  As the In re Gloria C. court stated, “[w]here a respondent has violated 
an order of protection issued to a child that has been born, legal redress is not 
absolutely dependent upon the willingness of the natural mother to proceed.”173  If 
the child’s CPO was obtained while he or she was still in utero, “the court could 
proceed [to apply a remedy] even in the absence of the mother’s desire to proceed or 
willingness to continue.”174  Thus, even if a mother’s judgment became 
compromised by the influence of an abuser, a child would still enjoy adequate 
protection from domestic violence.  If a fetus’ right to a CPO were established, there 
would be “[n]o rational basis to deprive the unborn of the same enforcement 
procedures available to the child already born.”175 
VI. CONCERNS REGARDING WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS  
Some feminist advocates would likely argue that the proposed approach towards 
civil protection orders impinges on female reproductive rights.176  Their concerns lie 
in the possibility that another family member, and not the mother, would use a CPO 
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on the subject of domestic violence law have stated:  
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BENCHBOOK, supra note 39, at 36. 
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as a pretext for stopping the mother from aborting her fetus.177  Such concerns are 
certainly not without merit, for as Professor Dawn E. Johnson has stated, “[a] 
woman’s right to bodily autonomy in matters concerning reproduction is protected 
by the constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy. . . . Any legal recognition of 
the fetus should be scrutinized to ensure that it does not infringe on women’s 
constitutionally protected interests in liberty and equality during pregnancy.”178  
Professor Johnson would call any expansion of fetal protective rights “foreboding” 
in light of its potential impact on maternal freedom.179 
Another prominent Professor on reproductive law, Linda C. Fentiman, articulated 
in a recent scholastic publication that “[t]he last few years have witnessed an 
astonishing array of intrusive and punitive government actions against pregnant 
women.  These government interventions, ranging from criminal prosecutions and 
fetal ‘guardianship’ proceedings to statutes safeguarding ‘the unborn’ and new 
‘regulatory interpretations’ of existing law, are touted as necessary to protect fetuses 
. . . .”
180
  She continued: 
Current “fetal protection” efforts pack a triple whammy: they 
undermine women’s health, limit women’s ability to fully participate in 
the economic life of the nation, and disproportionately affect the indigent 
and racial minorities.  First, the new “fetal protection” threatens to limit 
women’s ability to participate in the workforce and control their 
reproductive capability by raising the specter of civil or criminal liability 
if they engage in potentially risky activities before or during pregnancy.  
Second, many “fetal protection” initiatives seek to redefine the fetus as a 
person, with rights fully equal to those of a born human being, in a thinly 
disguised effort to limit abortion access.  Finally, efforts to constrain 
women’s actions for the benefit of their fetuses frequently reflect racial, 
gender, and class stereotypes about how women in general, or certain 
groups of women, do or should behave.  It does not appear coincidental 
that poor women and women of color are the main targets of “fetal 
protection” efforts.181 
Such concerns can be allayed by the recognition that, as previously mentioned, 
abortion after fetal viability is already generally criminalized within the state of 
Ohio.182  An individual may not perform an abortion after viability unless “the 
abortion is necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or a serious risk of 
the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the 
pregnant woman,” or the fetus in question later becomes unviable.183  
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Even if a family member other than the mother attempted to use a CPO to 
prevent an abortion during these narrowest of circumstances, the text of O.R.C. § 
3113.31(C)(1) would almost certainly prevent this from occurring.  The statute states 
that “[t]he petition [for relief under the domestic violence statute] shall 
contain . . . [a]n allegation that the respondent engaged in domestic violence against 
a family or household member of the respondent, including a description of the 
nature and extent of the domestic violence.”184  
In other words, in order for another family member to abuse the CPO statute as a 
pretext for preempting an abortion vital to the health of an expectant mother, the 
family member would have to articulate to a court some form of previous “abuse” 
that the mother perpetrated on the fetus.  Though the Ohio Supreme Court has held 
that pre-natal drug-use is a form of per-se child abuse, it made its ruling regarding 
situations after the birth of the child.185  Petitioners would certainly have a very 
difficult time articulating any sort of tangible abuse beyond situations such as these.  
Dictum from the In re Gloria C. decision addresses these concerns regarding 
women’s reproductive health rights head on.  In his opinion, Judge Daniel D. Leddy 
Jr. states: 
In the case at bar, the State’s interest in protecting the fetus is 
consistent with the petitioner mother’s desire and  right to give birth to a 
healthy baby and in no way conflicts with her privacy right to freely 
decide what to do with her pregnancy.  Exclusion of the fetus from 
protection under a remedial statute “serves only to immunize a wrongdoer 
from liability”; it does not serve to further the woman’s constitutional 
right to privacy.  In an article 8 proceeding [New York’s CPO statute], the 
court is solely concerned with the fetus for the purpose of effectuating the 
statutory protection of a person from harm by another member of the 
family or household.  In a statutory context not involving the mother’s 
privacy interest, “person” may have a different legal meaning than in the 
abortion context.186 
Therefore, although in many circumstances, other, more intrusive “fetal 
protection initiatives” might impinge on the personal rights of a pregnant mother, 
reproductive health advocates should not be alarmed by a broad interpretation of the 
word “child” under O.R.C. § 3113.31.  Such a broad interpretation will not hamper a 
woman’s constitutional right to privacy. 
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 Id. § 3113.31(C)(1). 
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 See In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000). 
 
186
 In re Gloria C., 476 N.Y.S.2d at 997.  The opinion continues: 
  Furthermore, how could the mother’s privacy right be invoked to insulate a third 
party’s behavior from the court’s family offense jurisdiction?  The right to abort is the 
mother’s not the father’s.  Invalidating a spousal consent provision of Missouri’s 
abortion statute, the Supreme Court held, “the State cannot delegate authority to any 
particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period [first 
trimester].”  Therefore, this court believes that a father should not be allowed, by 
violent actions against the mother, to cause such a result. 
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 
(1976). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In The Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order and the Role of the Court, 
distinguished Domestic Court Judge Michael J. Voris plainly stated that rather than 
shirking from the challenges presented by domestic violence, “[a]dvanced societies 
take intra-family violence seriously.”187  He emphasized that Ohio judges have a 
unique “leadership role in enlightening and educating attorneys and the community 
in general about the severity of the domestic violence issues.”188  Furthermore, he 
stated: 
Because the language of the [domestic violence] statutes is broad, the 
response of the Court has a profound impact in protecting victims of 
domestic violence.  Judges have the power and authority to implement the 
legislation. . . . Judges can communicate a powerful message about the 
justice system’s view of domestic violence within their own 
courtrooms.189  
Based on the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the prevailing interpretation of 
O.R.C. § 3113.31 unreasonably allows situations detrimental to the safety of 
newborn children to exist within the state of Ohio.  Judges have the authority to 
remedy this problem without the need for further legislation.  Ohio courts should 
interpret O.R.C. § 3113.31 so as to include viable, unborn fetuses as parties entitled 
to CPOs.  Doing so will prevent exposing infants to perilous intervals without 
protective coverage.  What better way to send a “powerful message” regarding the 
judicial system’s stance on domestic violence? 
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